Abstract. The analysis of security protocols requires precise formulations of the knowledge of protocol participants and attackers. In formal approaches, this knowledge is often treated in terms of message deducibility and indistinguishability relations. In this paper we study the decidability of these two relations. The messages in question may employ functions (encryption, decryption, etc.) axiomatized in an equational theory. Our main positive results say that, for a large and useful class of equational theories, deducibility and indistinguishability are both decidable in polynomial time.
Introduction
Understanding security protocols often requires reasoning about the knowledge of legitimate protocol participants and attackers. As a simple example, let us consider a protocol in which A sends to B a message that consists of a secret s encrypted under a pre-arranged shared key k. One may argue that, after processing this message, B knows s. More interestingly, one may also argue than an attacker with bounded computing power that does not know k but eavesdrops on the communications between A and B and sees the message does not learn s.
Accordingly, formal methods for the analysis of security protocols rely on definitions of the knowledge of protocol participants and attackers. In those methods, the knowledge of an attacker is used to determine what messages the attacker can send at each point in time-it can send only messages it knows. Moreover, security guarantees can be phrased in terms of the knowledge of the attacker. For example, a guarantee might be that, at the end of a protocol run, the attacker does not know a particular key, or that the attacker does not know whether a certain ciphertext contains the plaintext "true" or "false". For such applications, although the attacker is typically an active entity that can learn by conducting experiments, the definition of knowledge focuses on a particular point in a protocol execution.
Many formal definitions explain the knowledge of an attacker in terms of message deduction (e.g., [17, 19, 21, 20] ). Given a set of messages S and another message M , one asks whether M can be computed from S. The messages are represented by expressions, and correspondingly the computations allowed are symbolic manipulations of those expressions. Intuitively these computations can rely on any step that an eavesdropper who has obtained the messages in S can perform on its own in order to derive M . For example, the eavesdropper can encrypt and decrypt using known keys, and it can extract parts of messages.
Despite its usefulness in proofs about protocol behaviors, the concept of message deduction does not always provide a sufficient account of knowledge, and it is worthwhile to consider alternatives. For instance, suppose that we are interested in a protocol that transmits an encrypted boolean value, possibly a different one in each run. We might like to express that this boolean value remains secret by saying that no attacker can learn it by eavesdropping on the protocol. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to say that an attacker cannot deduce the well-known boolean values "true" and "false". Instead, we may say that the attacker cannot distinguish an instance of the protocol with the value "true" from one with the value "false". More generally, we may say that two systems are equivalent when an attacker cannot distinguish them, and we may then express security guarantees as equivalences. The use of equivalences is common in computational approaches to cryptography (e.g., [16] ), and it also figures prominently in several formal methods (e.g., [4, 18, 2] ).
Two systems that output messages that an attacker can tell apart are obviously distinguishable. Conversely, in order to establish equivalences between systems, an important subtask is to establish equivalences between the messages that the systems generate (for example, between the encrypted boolean values). These equivalences may be called static equivalences, because they consider only the messages, not the dynamic processes that generate them. Bisimulation proof techniques can reduce process equivalences to static equivalences plus fairly standard bisimulation conditions [2] (see also [3, 9] ).
In this paper we study the decidability of message deduction and static equivalence. We define a relation φ M that means that M can be deduced from φ, and a relation ϕ ≈ s ψ that means that ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent; here φ, ϕ, and ψ are all essentially lists of messages, each with a name, represented by formal expressions. For generating these messages, we allow the application of a wide array of functionspairing, projections, various flavors of encryption and decryption, digital signatures, one-way hash functions, etc.. Indeed, our results do not make any assumption on any particular cryptographic system beyond fairly general hypotheses on the form of the equational theory that is used for defining the properties of the cryptographic operations. Our main positive results assume only that the equational theory is defined by a convergent rewriting system with a finite number of rules of the form M → N where N is a proper subterm of M or a constant symbol. Such theories, which we call convergent subterm theories, appear frequently in applications. For them, we obtain that both φ M and ϕ ≈ s ψ are decidable, in fact in polynomial time. For other equational theories, even decidable ones, we show that φ M and ϕ ≈ s ψ can be undecidable. Moreover, we establish that can be reduced to ≈ s (not too surprisingly), but that the converse does not hold.
The problem of deciding knowledge is particularly important in the context of algorithms and tools for automated protocol analysis. Often, special techniques are introduced for particular sets of cryptographic operations of interest, on a case-by-case basis.
For example, the classic Dolev-Yao result deals with a fixed, limited suite of public-key operations [15] ; more recent decidability results deal with exclusive-or and modular exponentiation (e.g., [10] [11] [12] ); many variants and combinations that arise in practice have not yet been explored. On the other hand, other algorithms and tools (e.g., [6] [7] [8] ) allow much freedom in the choice of cryptographic operations but their analysis of the knowledge of the attacker is not always guaranteed to terminate. Decidability results under general equational theories have been rare. The most relevant previous work is that of Comon-Lundh and Treinen [13] , who have studied the decidability of the deduction problem for a class of equational theories incomparable with ours. (For example, they allow the homomorphism property enc( u, v , k) = enc(u, k), enc(v, k) but not the inverse property I(I(x)) = x.) Simultaneously with our work (but independently), Delaune and Jacquemard [14] have shown that the deduction problem is decidable for an active attacker and under a class of equational theories which is included in ours. Neither Comon-Lundh and Treinen nor Delaune and Jacquemard considered static equivalence.
The next section, section 2, introduces notations and definitions. Section 3 compares and ≈ s . Section 4 focuses on convergent subterm theories and gives our main decidability results. Section 5 concludes and discusses the possible use of our results for automated analysis of security protocols. Because of space constraints, we omit many technical details; the main ones appear in a research report [1] .
Basic definitions
Next we review definitions from previous work. We mostly adopt the definitions of the applied pi calculus [2] . In section 2.1 we give the syntax of expressions. In section 2.2 we explain a representation for the information available to an observer who has seen messages exchanged in the course of a protocol execution. In section 2.3 and 2.4 we present the relations and ≈ s , which (as explained in the introduction) provide two formalizations of the knowledge that the observer has on the basis of that information.
Syntax
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, such as enc and pair, each with an arity. Let ar(Σ) be the maximal arity of a function symbol in Σ. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant symbol.
Given a signature Σ, an infinite set of names N , and an infinite set of variables, the set of terms is defined by the grammar:
where f ranges over the function symbols of Σ and l matches the arity of f . Although names, variables, and constant symbols have similarities, we find it clearer to keep them separate. A term is closed when it does not have free variables (but it may contain names and constant symbols). We write fn(M ) for the set of names that occur in the term M . We use meta-variables u, v, w to range over names and variables. The size |T | of a term T is defined by |u| = 1 and
We equip the signature Σ with an equational theory E, that is, an equivalence relation on terms that is closed under substitutions of terms for variables and closed under application of contexts. We write M = E N when M and N are closed terms and the equation M = N is in E. We use the symbol == to denote syntactic equality of closed terms. As in these definitions, we often focus on closed terms for simplicity.
Assembling terms into frames
After a protocol execution, an attacker may know a sequence of messages M 1 , . . . , M l . This means that it knows each message but it also knows in which order it received the messages. So it is not enough for us to say that the attacker knows the set of terms {M 1 , . . . , M l }. Furthermore, we should distinguish those names that the attacker had before the execution from those that were freshly generated and which may remain secret from the attacker; both kinds of names may appear in the terms.
In the applied pi calculus [2] , such a sequence of messages is organized into a frame ν nσ, where n is a finite set of names (intuitively, the fresh names), and σ is a substitution of the form:
The variables enable us to refer to each M i , for example for keeping track of their order of transmission. We always assume that the terms M i are closed. The size of a frame
Deduction
Given a frame φ that represents the information available to an attacker, we may ask whether a given term closed M may be deduced from φ. This relation is written φ M (following Schneider [21] ). It is axiomatized by the rules:
Since the deducible messages depend on the underlying equational theory, we write E when E is not clear from the context. Intuitively, the deducible messages are the messages of φ and the names which are not protected in φ, closed by equality in E and closed by application of functions. We have the following characterization of deduction: Proposition 1. Let M be a closed term and ν nσ be a frame. Then ν nσ M if and only if there exists a term ζ such that fn(ζ) ∩ n = ∅ and ζσ = E M .
As an example, we consider the equational theory of pairing and symmetric encryption. The signature is Σ 1 = {pair, enc, fst, snd, dec}. As usual, we write x, y instead of pair(x, y). The theory E 1 is defined by the axioms:
Let φ def = νk, s{enc(s, k)/x, k/y}. Then φ k and φ s. Furthermore, we have k = E1 yφ and s = E1 dec(x, y)φ.
Static equivalence
Deduction does not always suffice for expressing the knowledge of an attacker, as discussed in the introduction. For example, consider φ 1 def = νk{enc(0, k)/x, k/y} and φ 2 def = νk{enc(1, k)/x, k/y}, where 0, 1 ∈ Σ are constant symbols. The attacker can deduce the same set of terms from these two frames since it knows 0 and 1. But it could tell the difference between these two frames by checking whether the decryption of x with y produces 0 or 1.
We say that two terms M and N are equal in the frame ϕ for the equational theory E, and write (M = E N )ϕ, if and only if ϕ = ν n.σ, M σ = E N σ, and { n}∩(fn(M )∪fn(N )) = ∅ for some names n and substitution σ. Then we say that two frames ϕ and ψ are statically equivalent, and write ϕ ≈ s ψ, when dom(ϕ) = dom(ψ) and when, for all terms M and N , we have (M = E N )ϕ if and only if (M = E N )ψ. We write ≈ sE when E is not clear from the context.
In our example, we have (dec(x, y)
Comparison of deduction and static equivalence
We compare equality, deduction, and static equivalence from the point of view of decidability. There is little hope that deduction or static equivalence would be decidable when equality itself is not. (We note however that, for some artificial, especially designed equational theories, deduction may be decidable while equality is undecidable.) Therefore, we focus on equational theories for which equality is at least decidable.
may be undecidable
Unfortunately, the decidability of equality is not sufficient for the decidability of deduction and static equivalence. As evidence, let us consider the decidable equational theory E 2 defined by:
According to these equations, the symbol · is associative and distributes over the symbol [ ], and any term of the form f (M, M ) can be collapsed into any term f (M , M ) where M is a prefix of M . This equational theory enables us to encode the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP) into the deduction problem.
Proposition 2. The deduction problem for E 2 ( E2 ) is undecidable.
The PCP is: given a finite number of pairs of words (u i , v i ) 1≤i≤n on the alphabet A ⊂ N , does there exists a sequence s 1 · · · s k ∈ {1..n} * such that:
Then we can verify that there exists a solution to the PCP if and only if there exists a letter a ∈ A such that (νΣ)σ E2 T ([a, a] ).
reduces to ≈ s
Next we show that deduction may be reduced to static equivalence. For this purpose, we add the familiar equation dec(enc(x, y), y) = x. (We have not studied what happens without this equation, since it is so common in applications.) Proposition 3. Let E be an equational theory over some signature Σ. Let 0, 1 be two constants, dec and enc be two binary function symbols that are not in Σ. 
We derive that if ≈ s is decidable for E {dec(enc(x, y), y) = x}, then is decidable for E (with at most the same complexity).
≈ s does not reduce to in general
The converse is not true: may be decidable while ≈ s is not. Indeed, we can encode an undecidable problem into the static equivalence problem in such a way that the deduction problem remains decidable.
Proposition 4. There exists an equational theory such that ≈ s is undecidable while is decidable.
We consider the following construction: Given two deterministic Turing machines M 1 = (Q, A, q 0 , Q f , δ 1 ) and M 2 = (Q, A, q 0 , Q f , δ 2 ) with the same control states, where
Since the machines M 1 and M 2 are deterministic, a run of the machine M(M 1 , M 2 ) on a word w may be described by a word s of {1, 2} * , which gives the list of choices made by
→ denotes the machine (with its current tape) after the sequence of choices s on the word w. We assume that the local control state is written on the tape. We reduce this undecidable problem to the ≈ s problem under an equational theory E 3 such that remains decidable. The intuitive idea of our encoding is that a frame φ represents a machine of the form M(M 1 , M 2 ), a term M represents a sequence of choices such that M φ represents the tape of the machine (and the number of choices) after this sequence of choices. Then, for two "machines" φ and φ , it is undecidable whether there exists two sequences of choices
On the other hand, it is possible to decide whether there exists a sequence of choices M such that M φ = E3 N (i.e., whether φ N ) for a given term N . Indeed, the term N contains the number of choices, so it is sufficient to test any sequence of choices of length equal to this number of choices.
Deciding knowledge under convergent subterm theories
In order to obtain decidability results for both and ≈ s , we restrict attention to subterm theories, defined by a finite set of equations of the form M = N where N is a proper subterm of M or a constant symbol. In section 4.1, we motivate and introduce a convergence condition on subterm theories. Convergent subterm theories are quite common in applications, as we illustrate with examples in section 4.2. We present our main decidability results for these theories in section 4.3.
Convergence
The definition of subterm theories is almost vacuous on its own. Even equality may be undecidable for subterm theories. Any equational theory defined by a finite set of equations M = M with variables can be encoded as a subterm theory, with the two equations:
In light of this encoding, we should add the assumption that, by orienting the equations that define a subterm theory from left to right, we obtain a convergent rewriting system: Definition 1. A equational theory E, defined by a finite set of equations
We write U → V if U and V are closed terms and U may be rewritten to V (in one step) using a rule of r(E).
As usual, if r(E) is convergent then for all terms U, V , we have U = E V if and only if U ↓= V ↓, where U ↓ and V ↓ are the normal forms of U and V .
We write → E instead of → when the equational theory is not clear from the context.
Examples
Important destructor-constructor rules like those for pairing, encryption, and signature may be expressed in subterm theories (typically convergent ones):
fst(< x, y >) = x dec(enc(x, y), y) = x snd(< x, y >) = y check(x, sign(x, sk(y)), pk(y)) = ok Additional examples can be found in previous work (e.g., [2, 8] ). Convergent subterm theories also enable us to capture sophisticated but sensible properties, as in:
The theory E 4 models an inverse function. The theory E 5 models a hash function that is idempotent on small inputs (since the hash of a hash gives the same hash). The theory E 6 represents an encryption function that also decrypts: the encryption of a plaintext, twice with the same key, returns the plaintext.
Decidability results
For convergent subterm theories, both and ≈ s become decidable. Let E be a convergent subterm theory given by 
Conclusion
This paper investigates decidability questions for message deducibility and static equivalence, two formal representations for knowledge in the analysis of security protocols. This investigation yields a few somewhat negative results, for example that static equivalence cannot always be reduced to message deducibility. On the other hand, the main results are strong, positive ones: both message deducibility and static equivalence are decidable in polynomial time under a large and useful class of equational theories.
These positive results suggest some directions for further research in protocol analysis. In the general case of infinite-state protocols, our algorithms could be integrated into analysis tools; substantial work on optimizations may however be required. For finite-state protocols, various security properties are decidable under specific equational theories (e.g., [5] ). Perhaps our results can serve as the starting point for a generalization to a broad class of equational theories. This generalization may be easy if one restricts attention to passive attackers (eavesdroppers): since the capabilities of eavesdroppers are limited to deducing and comparing messages, our decidability results may apply fairly directly. The case with active attackers is clearly more difficult and interesting; as mentioned in the introduction, Delaune and Jacquemard have recently proved that the deduction problem is still decidable for a subclass of convergent subterm theories. It remains to study whether this work could be extended to establish process equivalences (such as testing equivalences [4] ).
